Retrieve
Find potentially relevant information from approved sources while preserving source identity, permissions, revision, and applicability.
Practical guide
A named reviewer is not enough. Meaningful review requires accessible evidence, relevant competence, sufficient time, actual authority, a reversible decision point, and an escalation path.
Why the phrase is insufficient
“Human in the loop” does not say whether the person can see the governing evidence, understands the decision, has time to inspect the output, can reject it without penalty, or acts before an irreversible consequence. A reviewer who only clicks approve after a system has already changed a record or triggered production is not the same as a reviewer who can challenge the basis before action.
Design review around the decision, not around a generic approval button. Name what the system proposes, what evidence accompanies it, what the person must determine, what authority that person holds, and what happens when information is incomplete or disputed.
Assistance categories
These verbs describe assistance, not authority. Connecting the capability to a company system or receiving fluent output does not give it permission to approve, commit, release, dispose, or change controlled work.
Find potentially relevant information from approved sources while preserving source identity, permissions, revision, and applicability.
Highlight differences between supplied documents, records, or revisions for a qualified person to evaluate.
Structure incoming information, list omissions, classify routine content, and prepare a review queue without resolving material uncertainty.
Prepare a summary, clarification request, work note, or response that a named person verifies before use.
Authority map
| Stage | System may | Person must | Evidence needed | Escalation example |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assist | Retrieve, compare, extract, organize, draft, or flag. | Confirm the task and inspect relevant sources. | Citations, scope, inputs, revision, and uncertainty. | Missing or conflicting governing source. |
| Recommend | Propose a classification, action, or disposition. | Evaluate the rationale and alternatives. | Criteria, supporting facts, exceptions, and test behavior. | Case lies outside validated conditions. |
| Decide | Record an authorized person’s disposition. | Make the decision within actual delegated authority. | Complete decision package and unresolved items. | Authority belongs to another function or customer. |
| Execute | Prepare a downstream action after approval where permitted. | Confirm preconditions and retain the ability to stop. | Approval identity, state, change record, and safeguards. | Material mismatch between approved and executable state. |
| Oversee | Aggregate performance, errors, changes, and exceptions. | Review continued suitability and order correction, pause, or retirement. | Usage, failures, incidents, drift, complaints, and outcomes. | Risk or operating conditions materially changed. |
Retained decisions
| Authority area | Decisions people retain | Operating question |
|---|---|---|
| Commercial | Pricing, margin, terms, delivery commitments, bid decisions, and contractual acceptance. | Who can commit the company, and what review is required first? |
| Engineering | Design approval, technical interpretation, process approval, and release of manufacturing instructions. | Which qualified role controls the technical decision? |
| Quality | Inspection acceptance, nonconformance disposition, corrective-action approval, and product release. | Which authorized quality role accepts or escalates the evidence? |
| Operations | Schedule priorities, resource assignments, material movement, supplier decisions, and production changes under company policy. | Who owns the operating consequence and can stop the work? |
| Technology and data | Identity, permissions, approved sources, system connections, retention, logging, and production deployment. | Who authorizes the system and information boundary? |
Consequence and reversibility
A low-consequence internal draft may need a straightforward fact check. A supplier disposition, quality acceptance, engineering change, personnel action, safety instruction, contractual commitment, or production release requires authority and evidence appropriate to that decision. Some uses may remain unsuitable for AI assistance even with a reviewer if the system adds little value or creates automation bias, delay, opacity, or unacceptable information exposure.
Worked example
A system compares a new customer package with the approved baseline and proposes that three requirements changed. It supplies the source passages, revision identifiers, extracted values, comparison logic, and two unresolved conflicts. The manufacturing engineer may assess process impact, but cannot silently resolve a customer-quality interpretation that belongs to another authorized function.
The workflow therefore records each proposed delta separately, assigns the applicable reviewer, keeps conflicts open, and prevents a downstream baseline update until the required dispositions exist. The system can compile the package and record the decisions; it cannot turn its own extraction into approval. If the source is missing or authority is unclear, escalation is the correct result.
Escalation triggers
Evidence record
For a consequential workflow, the record may need the input state, governing source and revision, system version or configuration, generated proposal, cited evidence, uncertainty, reviewer identity and role, disposition, comments, escalation, downstream action, and later correction. Retention, access, signatures, validation, and audit requirements depend on the actual process and must be set by authorized owners.
Authority card
Use the card to train the task and test whether the operating roles agree. If the source owner, reviewer, final authority, or prohibited actions are unclear, resolve that condition before adding more automation.
Stress test
Use a direct practical test: if an incorrect output could commit the company, release product, accept nonconforming material, alter controlled instructions, or expose restricted information, require stronger deterministic controls and explicit human review. A prompt telling the model to “be careful” is not an authorization system.